 |
| Indira Mukherjee |
"You can change friends but not neighbours"
And it is largely because of this fact that India has, in a slow but steady pace, indulged in activities related to military expansion, capacity building, technology upgrade and increase prominence in the international arms market. This continues even today and in future will gain pace for sure.
However,
the moot point is that in this era of economic globalization and rapid changes
in the security paradigm, should a country like India rely on procuring
military hardware from other countries to save time crunch, ramp up world-class
military stockpile or focus more on indigenization to buttress sovereignty,
reduce costs? The answer to this is embedded in the historical backdrop, cold
war experience, political mindset and complexity of current world economic
coupling. While it might be an easy option to acquire arms from other countries
with reasonable expertise in this field, not giving enough incentive and
encouragement to domestic military hardware production will enervate India’s
self-reliance in the long run. Overseas procurement and indigenization of
defence equipments are two sides of the same coin and needs to be balanced
carefully for making a strong, mighty and calculative India. To understand the
complexity of arriving at a decision with respect to the preferred avenue for
enhancing military capabilities, the following aspects should be considered:
- · Legacy of military restraint
- · Stimulus for defence ramp up
- · On indigenization
- · Benefits and problems of foreign purchase
- · The way forward
Legacy of Military
Restraint
Reticence
in the use of force as an instrument of state policy has been the dominant
political condition for Indian thinking on the military [1]. Be it the delay of sending troops to Kashmir in 1948 or
the slackened pace of indulging into nuclear testing, India has always reacted
with immense amount of restraint in military matters. One might argue that this
approach adheres to the words of Isaac Asimov that –
“Violence...is the last refuge of the
incompetent”
But
many a times, this slowness gives out a wrong signal to the other side. After
all, there is no gainsaying in the fact that the world reacts to and observes
muscle flexing with hawkish eyes and not to mere promises or ideology only.
Individual
leadership has also led to the evolution of this thought process – India under
Jawaharlal Nehru was an example of unified idealism [2].
He was a firm believer in peaceful coexistence and exercised extreme caution
before resorting to any military involvement. The case was that of intermittent
realism under Indira Gandhi, who waited long for the escalation of the refugee
problem before sending troops to East Pakistan. However, India’s stance in 2013
is an example of economic pragmatism and that probably outweighs any other idea,
including restraint. A delay in reacting to issues of security undermines the
relative strength of a country and India does not wish to be in that category.
This
policy of restraint had its own set of ramifications – immediately post
independence, the Indian establishment focussed on high ideals and gave less
importance to military build up. Once it was struck with the drag of 3 wars in
quick succession in 1960s-70s, a quick realization dawned which caused the
upper echelons to devise a strategy to scale up military hardware.
Socio-economic needs of the country were so pressing during this time that
buying arms from other countries seemed to be the quickest way out. This
restraint coupled with the polarisation of world support during the cold war
and the lack of Indian technical expertise in niche areas, in a way led to a
reduced emphasis on indigenization. Thus, to compensate this disadvantage, loss
of time and slow pace of research in the previous decades there was a greater
zeal to purchase world-class weaponry, especially post 1980s.
India
has definitely started moving away from this ideology of restraint, especially owing
to its growing affluence and greater presence in the world arena. However, any
dramatic changes seem to be at bay because India is a country where the
military preparation receives far less attention than it deserves due to the
socio-economic dynamics of the political compulsions. Hardly any party
manifestoes talk about defence related matters and to be honest, common people
are more attracted towards issues that affect them directly, on a daily basis
and not issues related to external security. However, it needs to be firmly
ingrained in our minds that drawing the attention of the political class
towards the increasing precarious situation in south Asia has become ever
important. Once this is understood and practiced, India might be able to start
shifting from the legacy of restraint and hasten its pace of defence production
and procurement – both locally and globally.
Stimulus
for Defence ramp up
Though
early Indian nationalists such as Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Gopal Krishna Gokhale
saw military service as a means to secure home rule; Mahatma Gandhi and
Jawaharlal Nehru, the two Indian leaders with the greatest influence on the
direction of independent India, saw military spending as a burden imposed by
the British in defence of their empire. In 1938 Jawaharlal Nehru wrote that
India did not face any significant military challenge; the only military role
he saw for the Indian Army was in suppressing the tribes of the North-West
Frontier Province, who were, in any case, too primitive in his view to fight a
modern military outside the tribal areas [3].
The
first major stimulus came with the 1962 China war. The debacle was too much of
a blot on the face for India at that time which was trying to tread the path of
non alignment. The economic and political crisis during 1960’s was so enhanced
that India started tilting towards Soviet Russia for its military needs.
Developing own hardware during that time was a distant dream, so purchasing
arms from friendly nations seemed to be the most practical solution. This pace
increased till 1991 when India had to look for alternate sources. Once the
economic liberalization regime kicked off, procuring arms from abroad helped in
achieving the objective of saving time, ensuring global presence and acquiring
the most advanced weaponry of the time. In the 21st century, new actors cropped
up for India’s military needs – products of Boeing, Israeli Aerospace Industries
[IAI] and MIG started entering Indian soil at a rapid pace. This was coupled
with conducting joint army-naval-air exercises with other countries so as to
assess comparative strengths, weaknesses, obstacles, threats and eventually,
devise the roadmap for increasing military hardware. This included foreign
purchase as well as indigenization efforts. However, imports have gained an
upper edge over local production. In fact, in 2013 India was declared the
world's biggest weapons importer, ahead
of China [4].
South
Asia might not have witnessed any large scale military event after the 1999
Kargil crisis but it has always been simmering with security issues. In recent
times, it has escalated to a different proportion all together, and that too
simultaneously – the beheading of Indian soldiers in Pakistan, the lurking head
of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the ethnic strife in Myanmar, the political coup
in Maldives or the incessant constitutional crisis in Nepal. India lies at the
centre of all this and is left with no option but to focus on its external
security situation. Piracy along the Indian Ocean is another important root of
this equation especially because most of India’s imports and exports are routed
through international waterways. A strong and self reliant India with a strong
arms base is thus a “sine qua non” - not
for attacking but for defending ourselves and assisting our strategic partners.
Another very important reason for India to step up its defence production/procurement
process is its geographical proximity with China. It is interesting to note
that both India and China achieved their independence at roughly the same time,
they have similar population but after about 65 years of their free existence,
there is a huge difference between their military capabilities. A relative
comparison between the two may be tabulated hereunder [5]-->
India
|
China
|
|
Total Aircraft Strength
|
1962
|
5048
|
Total Helicopter Strength
|
620
|
901
|
Total Mortar Strength
|
5000
|
10050
|
Anti-Tank Weaponry
Strength
|
51800
|
31250
|
Total Navy Ship Strength
|
170
|
972
|
Submarine Fleet Strength
|
15
|
63
|
Active Military Personnel
|
1325000
|
2285000
|
The
numbers speak for themselves and a fuel to this, is the discussion in foreign
policy think tanks on “String of Pearls”.
At the ground level, it means that China is indulging into an encirclement
strategy across the Indian coastline by setting up points of strategic
influence like Coco Islands off Myanmar, Hambantota port in Srilanka and Gwadar
in Pakistan; this has created an immense pressure on the military establishment
of India to resort to different means to catch up with the military inventory
of China – be it via local production or via importing arms from other players
in the world.
On
Indigenization
Indigenization of military hardware is a
conscious effort on the part of the defence establishment to develop products
which suit Indian needs, circumstances and demands. In recent months, our
Defence Minister, Shri A K Antony, has been repeatedly exhorting the armed
forces to procure their weapons and equipment from indigenous sources. It is a
well-established fact that no nation aspiring a great power status can expect
to achieve it without being substantively self-reliant in defence production [7]. It is widely held that the growing influence
of India in the African continent and in Latin America will hugely be enhanced,
provided India is able to tap their arms import market and sell off its
indigenously developed military hardware. There is a strong local lobbying
force in India which wishes to garner the benefits of investment and production
in this sector. Also, it is also commonly believed that indigenization of
defence equipments is the best possible way to move away from the corruption at
the top-level owing to inter-country defence deals.
One of the earliest initiatives towards
indigenization is the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme [IGMDP].
India has gradually achieved self reliance in the area of ballistic missiles
and the epitome of this feat is the successful testing of the Inter-continental
Ballistic missile [ICBM] Agni V. Similar efforts in this regards are the Main
Battle Tank Arjun, HAL’s Light Combat Aircraft Tejas and INS Sunayna - India’s
largest Offshore Patrol Vessel OPV. A very seminal role in this regard is played
by the Defence Research and Development Organisation [DRDO], which is an arm of
the Ministry of Defence [MoD]. It caters to the research needs of all the three
wings of the army-navy-air force and develops products on a pilot basis for
onward mass production by the Ordnance factories.
One of the major and recent most efforts
towards indigenization has been the F-INSAS project which is meant to equip the
Infantry with state-of-the-art equipment. F-INSAS
means Futuristic Infantry Soldier as a System.[8] It basically
aims at "converting an infantryman
into a fully-networked all-terrain, all-weather, weapons platform with enhanced
lethality, survivability, sustainability, mobility and situational awareness"
for the digitised battlefield of the future. Most of the equipments are being
developed by DRDO.
However, there are some basic issues
surrounding this, and for that matter any military hardware indigenization
program in India which has to go through the unavoidable process of trinity - DRDO
"creates" on a pilot basis,
Ordnance Factories "produces"
on a mass basis and the Army/Navy/Air Force expects on "State-of the Art" basis. DRDO
complains of not having quality engineers owing to “brain drain” while Ordnance factories complain of getting
impractical solutions from DRDO and the latter is unable to understand the
bottlenecks in a mass production assembly line. Thus, there is a disconnect
between the DRDO and Ordnance factory board. Quality control, adherence to
specifications, bureaucratic hassles and corruption are additional bottlenecks.
Another aspect related to the Government
of India’s official policy towards purchasing military hardware is the
procurement process. The Defence Procurement Procedure [DPP] manual was
introduced in 2005 and was amended once again in April 2013 to reflect the
current thinking on ‘buying Indian’.
However, the emphasis on self-reliance remains wishful thinking at present as
most weapons and equipment continue to be imported. Thus, even if products are
locally made, the dependency on foreign countries continues as the constituent
parts are often made abroad. Moreover, the lack of clarity on guidelines for
local procurement, differences between the political establishment and military
personnel with respect to the percentage of private participation and relative
dichotomy of their approach towards indigenization makes the situation complex.
Benefits and problems of foreign purchase
The two world wars and the arms race
during the cold war gave an obvious advantage to US and USSR in terms of
accumulating military stockpile and investment in defence research. For
countries like India, purchasing arms from these countries was an attractive
deal and still is. Be it Akula-II
nuclear submarine or INS Vikramaditya
or AWACS or Sukhoi or Brahmos cruise
missile, each purchase/joint venture has acted as a feather in the military cap
of India – it has given India a relative edge in the world military stage. The
Indo-US nuclear deal has also led to an enhancement of Indian presence in the
global nuclear arena and with India winning the confidence of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group [NSG], the possibility of a nuclear foray into the military
sector in near future cannot be ruled out all together. Moreover, generally
speaking, an increased military trade relation between two countries is
advantageous to the economic prowess of the constituent parties. It boosts the
global economic cohesion and strengthens the pan-world business network.
A special mention in this regard is to
be made with respect to the rising stature of India in the world arms market as
a buyer. Very recently, India floated the tender for 126 Medium multi role
combat aircraft MMRCA in which the finalists included the French Dassault, American
Lockheed Martin, Euro-fighter, Sweden’s Saab and Russian MIG. The deal after
rounds of discussion on technical specifications, cost implications and
suitability of requirements, was clinched by the French manufacturer Dassault’s
Rafale. This is the biggest defence deal that India has floated and is meant to
inflate the image of India as one of the countries which are to be taken as
having a no nonsense attitude towards stepping up their military hardware. An
enhanced co-operation in military matters has a domino effect on other sectors
as well leading to cost optimization for the receiving country. For e.g. – the
Dassault deal is allegedly clubbed with the French Areva nuclear reactors in
Jaitapur. It also gives some kind of fuel to the items of track II diplomacy, be
it in cultural or social or educational initiatives.
However, an indiscriminate buying of
foreign military hardware has its own set of issues. While India has been
manufacturing Russian fighter aircraft and tanks under license for many years,
the Russians never actually transferred weapons technology to India [7]. For any problems, maintenance and upgrade, we
have to depend on Russian technicians. Additionally, with respect to US, any
arms purchase is tied to a host of agreements like End Use Monitoring Agreement
[EUMA]. EUMA is rooted in the extraterritorial application of U.S. law, which
demands “reasonable assurance” that
the recipient state is complying with American regulations regarding the use
and security of defence articles and services. The avowed aim is to enhance
American national-security and foreign-policy objectives [9].
There is no such thing as a “free lunch” – quid pro quo is one of the
biggest realities of today’s world and it works in the field of defence deals as
well. When a country wishes to export its top class military products to India,
it usually ends up engaging itself in a lobbying practice in India. Unhealthy
competition in this area leads to corruption, which is the most dangerous
predicament of such foreign defence deals. Military scams like Bofors, Tatra,
Scorpene deal, Chopper gate etc have grossly tarnished the image of the Indian political
establishment which often pushes such deals in return of kick backs. At the end
of the day, it is the poor tax payer’s money which goes to a waste. Billions are
spent on such deals and many a times it does not serve the purpose of strengthening
security as most of the equipments need to be frequently sent abroad for non-adherence
to performance expectations, retro-fitting and upgrade. This process traps us
in the loop of everlasting foreign dependence.
The way forward
The Security scenario around us is so
volatile that we cannot afford to take any risks. We are living in dangerous
surroundings, so armed forces need the most modern equipments at the earliest. Our
armed forces is the most vital asset of the country – disaster management
during floods, earthquakes, tsunami or prevention of communal riots or efforts
towards counter insurgency operations; none of these work without their
assistance. There is a perceived feeling in the political circles that the
armed forces have a mindset of relying on imports to meet operational
requirements [10]. This is primarily because
of the displeasure shown by the Tri-services towards delay in indigenous
production coupled with non-performance of locally made military hardware. While
this cannot be entirely denied but it simultaneously undermines the vast
potential that the domestic defence production sector has and the kind of long
term stability that it can impart to India’s military sector. In the short run,
procuring arms from abroad might be the preferred route, but for long term
sustainability, there needs to be an equal stress on indigenization of military
hardware.
As the largest buyer of arms in the
world, India should stress on joint ventures and partnerships with the foreign
arms suppliers and should not restrict itself as a buyer only. A successful
example in this regard is the Indo-Russian joint production of the Brahmos cruise
missile which is the fastest supersonic missile in the world currently. Such collaboration
helps in achieving technical expertise and knowhow in a stepwise fashion
leading to gradual self reliance. Arranging for simple clearance rules for FDI
in selected sectors of defence production will also act as an incentive to the
foreign players. Popularizing defence expo to showcase the latest military
equipments and clubbing associated deals with offers in other sectors will also
act as a booster for India’s military image.
Additionally, with the withdrawal of
NATO troops from Afghanistan in 2014, India will have a larger role to play in
South Asia and a stockpile of the best of world weaponry will actually help us
in protecting the Central Asian country from relapsing into chaos. Considering
the piracy threat along the littoral states of Indian Ocean, acquiring
sophisticated naval equipments from the big players of the world will help us
in curbing the menace of piracy with even more alacrity. Organizing naval, army or air exercises with
other countries on a regular basis will help us in assessing our situation,
preparedness and learn the best practices across the world. This will fall in
place once the constituent parties indulge in trade related to military
hardware.
As far as local production is concerned,
there should be more synthesis between the interests of the armed forces and
the political establishment towards improvising indigenization, maintaining transparency
and continuous monitoring. Ensuring some kind of tandem via collaborative
research between the creativity of the DRDO, the capability of Ordnance
Factories and the demand of armed forces will surely help to reduce the
friction among the stakeholders of the defence establishment. Additionally, it
is very important that India steps up its defence budget. Indigenization cannot
happen overnight and hence, a strategic plan should be formulated by the
tri-services to map short term and long term interests, assumptions,
constraints, issues and risks so as to align them with the defence procurement
policy of India. In fact, the procurement process should be simplified and made
into a “single window” business. The
PSU’s and private sector should be encouraged to deliver efficiently and
effectively so that India can come out of the vicious cycle of reliance on
foreign technicians.
Our defence minister recently said that –
“Import is the last resort not the easiest
resort” [10]
Striking a balance between indigenization and
foreign purchase is the key to ensuring India’s military stability and
capability. The approach of the political establishment towards army needs must
be more focused and pragmatic. The government must give a firm commitment in
terms of funds and the MoD should streamline its procedures and processes for
speedy procurement of high priority weapons and equipments. On the other hand,
the tri-services should appreciate the political compulsions and set forth
their agenda and roadmap very clearly so as to extract maximum assistance from
the political class. A seamless coupling between the two will lead to a
stronger, mightier and resilient India. After all, a synergy between a
theoretical plan and implementation of the same in the field of arms purchase
and indigenization of military hardware is the key to making India a global
power to reckon with.
References:
[1] – Arming without aiming; Stephen P Cohen and
Sunil Dasgupta
[2] – Can the Elephant Dance? David Malone
[3] – The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the
Development of a Nation; Stephen P Cohen
[4] – http://www.sipri.org
; Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute
[6] – http://www.iiss.org/
; International
Institute for Strategic Studies
Indira Mukherjee is an IPS probationer of the 88th FC at
LBSNAA, Mussoorie. This post is a replica of her entry for the essay
competition.
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