What will the
post-2014 Afghanistan look like? The foreign forces are leaving Afghanistan by
2014 without stabilizing it. This will open up the possibility for the return
of Taliban. The prospect of national reconciliation is not also bright. In this
situation what should Afghanistan do? What are the challenges India will have
to face in post 2014? Those are the million dollar questions. Before entering
in those topics, we should briefly recapitulate the most important past
incidents of Afghanistan.
BACKGROUND
The
Taliban seized Kabul on 27 September, 1996 and established Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan, being supported by Pakistan (military support) and Saudi Arabia.
They imposed on the parts of Afghanistan under their control, their political
and judicial interpretation of Islam issuing edicts especially targeting women.
In this situation Massoud and Rashid Dostum created United Front to fight
against Taliban. The Taliban defeated Dostum’s Jumbish military forces in 1998.
According to a 55-page report of United Nations, the Taliban while trying to
consolidate control over northern and western Afghanistan committed systematic
massacres against civilians. Then Pakistan chief of army staff Pervez Musharraf
was responsible for sending thousands of Pakistani to fight alongside the
Taliban and Bin Laden against the forces of Massoud. From 1996-2001 the
Al-Qaeda terrorist network of Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri became a state within
Afghanistan. In early 2001, Massoud asked international community to provide
humanitarian help to the people of Afghanistan. On 9th September, 2001 Massoud was
assassinated by suicide attackers and two days later about 3,000 people were
killed in U.S.A. The U.S. government identified Laden, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
and Al-Qaeda organization based in and allied to Taliban’s Emirate of
Afghanistan as the perpetrators of the attacks as a result the U.S. lead forces
attacked Afghanistan and Taliban government was toppled. New government under
Hamid Karzai was formed. At the same time international security assistance
force was established by U.N Security Council to assist Karzai administration
and to provide security for the Afghan people.
While Taliban began regrouping inside Pakistan, more coalition troops
entered, escalating the U.S.-led war. Meanwhile the rebuilding of war torn
Afghanistan kicked off in 2002. The Afghan nation was able to form some
democratic structure over the years and some progress was made in key
areas such as governance, economy, health, education, transport and
agriculture. NATO is training Afghan armed forces as well its national police.
ISAF and Afghan troops led many offensives against Taliban but failed to defeat
them fully. By 2009 a Taliban-led shadow government began to form in many parts of the country complete with
their own version of mediation court.
In 2010 international conference of
Afghanistan in London, Afghan president Hamid Karzai said that he intended to
reach out to the Taliban leadership. Supported by NATO, Karzai called on group leadership to take part in a Loya Jirga
(mass meeting usually prepared for major events) meeting to initiate peace
talks. These steps have resulted in an intensification of bombing,
assassination and ambushes. Some Afghan groups believe that Karzai plans to
appease insurgents senior leadership at the cost of democratic constitution,
democratic process and progress in the field of human rights especially women’s
rights.
AF-PAK RELATION
Af-Pak relation began in August, 1947
after the partition of India which created the dominion of Pakistan (Now
Islamic Republic of Pakistan).
Relation
between two countries have been negatively affected by issues related to Durand
line, the 1978- present war (i.e. Mujahidin, Afghan refugees, Taliban
insurgencies and border skirmishes) including water and the growing influence
of India in Afghanistan.
THE EMERGING SITUATION
The
withdrawal of Western forces at the time when Afghanistan is far more
destabilized and insecure since 2001 inevitably raises several issues of
concern. After a decade long direct engagement and intervention, indifference
and apathy are growing in Western approach and strategy towards the future of
Afghanistan.
The Pakistan
politico-military stalemate, effectively maneuvered by the Pakistan-backed
Taliban and their allies, has made the war increasingly unsustainable for the West.
The Taliban guerrillas along with Haqqani network have quietly succeeded in
raising the rate of attrition among the Western forces who may have been winning the
battles but not the war. The Taliban and their allies despite not winning the
battles appear to be gaining and upper hand in the war. While Western forces
suffered from differing rules and perceptions about the war of terror, the
Taliban and their allies have unsteadily consolidated their influence and made
common cause against a vastly superior Western military. These have worked to
the advantage of the Taliban and their Pakistani sponsors.
The U.S. would like
to maintain some form of military presence in Afghanistan for years, beyond
2014. However, it is doubtful whether it will stabilize the country. Meanwhile
the three components of U.S. current strategy –reconciliation process with the
top insurgent leadership operating from Pakistan, rebuilding of Afghan national
forces (ANSF); and security transition to the ANSF by 2014-is least likely to
give expected results. Presently Afghanistan appears to be on the verge of
entering into the prolonged phase of anarchy and violence.
The whole idea of
negotiating ‘peace’ with Taliban is not very bright. It is opening up yet
another opportunity for Pakistani establishment to re-engineer the politics of
Afghanistan. The U.S. may temper Pakistani geo-political aspiration in
Afghanistan.
The U.S. and
Afghanistan signed a strategic partnership agreement on May 2; 2012.The May
agreement says that the countries would initiate, ‘negotiation on a Bilateral
Security Agreement’ soon after signing the strategic partnership agreement. So,
U.S. may retain its force in Afghanistan. Much would, therefore depend how
effective the limited U.S. presence would be after 2014, and how the West would
deal with Pakistan regarding the matter. However, the agreement is deemed
necessary for the survival of the government in Kabul and strengthening the
Afghan Army and police.
The
leadership question is also important here. It is still not clear if both
presidential and parliamentary election could be held in 2014-15, and how
credible the electoral exercise will be if ISAF pulls out or draws down from
Southern and Eastern parts of the country which would inevitably fall under the
direct control of Taliban. Finally if the election could not be held then what
are the possible alternatives available in terms of political arrangement to
ensure that there is no political vacuum in Kabul. This could be an opportunity
to temporarily bring U.S. and Pakistan together if both reach a consensus on
post Karzai leadership. This may subsequently lead to defection from the
Taliban, with so called ‘moderate’ Taliban joining the government. But it is
not very accepted theory to the vast section of Afghan people. In case of
failed political transition in 2014, there is a possibility of greater tension
between U.S. and Afghanistan, on one hand and between U.S. and Pakistan, on the
other. This may lead to greater anarchy or even a new round of civil war in
parts of the country. There could also be a special operation by U.S. commandos
against Haqqani network and Taliban leadership based inside Pakistan (like
operation Geronimo on May 2, 2001).
THE MOST LIKELY FUTURE SCENARIO
Based
on some broad historical determinants and political trends, an attempt can be
made to build the most likely future scenario as the Afghan conflict and war
enters the fourth decade. Afghanistan with virtually all state institutions
destroyed with no single authority enjoying National legitimacy; and with
people’s perception severely polarized along social and ideological lines, is
likely to remain in a state of socio-political ferment for decades to come.
Since the overthrow of monarchy in 1973 and subsequent destruction of old
political order, no political system or affecting national institution could
evolve in the country. The western attempt to create new political system after
the overthrow of Taliban in 2001 has failed for various reasons. The
perceptions about state, its orientation and authority, distribution of power,
and forms of governance are often too divergent and vary from region to region
and one ethnic group to another.
As 2014 approaches and most of the American
troops withdraw, the authority of Afghan government is further fragmented and
diluted. Thousands of American troops and troops from NATO countries would be
stationed in Kabul after the Kabul Washington strategic partnership agreement.
The west sponsored reconciliation initiatives continue to be rebuffed by
Taliban and Haqqani Network. America however continues to rely on drone strikes
and conducts special operation against insurgent leadership operating from
Pakistan. President Karzai is unable to hold the post beyond his term and
presidential and parliamentary elections might get delayed. The relation
between Washington and Islamabad remains tense. Hectic diplomatic efforts are
on to build consensus on the composition of a caretaker transitional
government. The Taliban continues to gain strength especially in the areas
around Kabul; groups from the north build alliances to deal with growing
insurgency.
Despite differences between U.S. and
Pakistan on post-Karzai arrangement, a caretaker transitional government which
is recognized by the U.N is appointed in Kabul pending Presidential and
Parliamentary elections. As election could not be held even after a prolonged
delay due to lack of security and resources, the caretaker transitional
government collapses and the Parliament is dysfunctional. By 2020, the joint
Afghan-U.S. military facilities are constantly under attack from Taliban and
Haqqani network. Defection from Afghan Army and police are frequent. However,
West continues to fund Afghan Army. The U.S. carries out some special operation
in Pakistan against the top Taliban leadership inside Pakistan and at the same
time to build and support a coalition comprising mainly functions from the
north and some Pasthun mitia from south and east, including few low and mid
level former Taliban commanders. NATO and Russia are working closely to ensure
supplies for the remaining American-led force fighting in Afghanistan. Groups
from the north are asking for defacto partition of the country. The
international community is engaged in a round of diplomatic initiatives to
bring various Afghan factions together. Political uncertainty and violence continues.
INDIA’S POLICY OPTIONS
As
per official statements: “India considers extremist ideologies to be very
dangerous and a national security threat. To that extent, India wants to
utilize its development program in Afghanistan (deny such ideologies space to
grow)to help Afghanistan stabilize and emerge as an economic hub linking south
and central Asia through a network of trade and transit linkages that would benefit
the people of entire region.”
However, India has limited leverages in
Afghanistan. It has not nurtured the different section of East. The Pashtuns
remains large indifferent towards India. For the non Pashtun groups, India is
possible counter-force to the Pakistan sponsored Pashtun insurgent groups,
especially Taliban.
Also, India hardly
figures in western straightly towards Afghanistan and Pakistan. India’s present
and relatively huge contribution has often initiated skepticism and critics in
view of her historically adversarial relations with Pakistan. It is generally
believed that Afghan problem can’t be resolved until India and Pakistan resolve
Kashmir issue.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1.
India should take long term policy towards Afghanistan. It may be increasingly
difficult for India to maintain the momentum of the relationship with
Afghanistan beyond 2014 due to lack of effective government in Kabul. The
training and capacity building program, India is conducting for Afghans too may
get disrupted. So, it is important for India to expand its engagement with
various Afghan factions, including Taliban elements willing to work with India.
2.
Since Pakistani establishment will always try to deny space for India in
Afghanistan, it is important that India develops its leverages within
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
3.
Due to fractious nature of Afghan politics, India should firmly avoid direct
military involvement in Afghanistan. However, as a follow-up to the strategic
partnership agreement India signed with Afghanistan October 2011,
institutionalizing its engagement with Afghan Army, police and the Afghan
intelligences should be a constant endeavor.
4.
Lastly, India’s policy should be innovative. India needs to make
people-to-people contact with Afghanistan and attract the young generation of
Afghanistan through its various policy and schemes.
References:
3. ’The Islamic challenges in west Asia’ (book)
-----------------------------------------------------
Arghyadip Bhattacharya, M. Sc(Applied Mathematics, C.U.),K.V.P.Y scholar.Any opinion expressed herein is solely that of the author and Indian Policy takes no responsibility for the facts and opinion laid down in the article.
-----------------------------------------------------
Arghyadip Bhattacharya, M. Sc(Applied Mathematics, C.U.),K.V.P.Y scholar.Any opinion expressed herein is solely that of the author and Indian Policy takes no responsibility for the facts and opinion laid down in the article.
No comments:
Post a Comment