THE AFGHANISTAN EQUATION

               What will the post-2014 Afghanistan look like? The foreign forces are leaving Afghanistan by 2014 without stabilizing it. This will open up the possibility for the return of Taliban. The prospect of national reconciliation is not also bright. In this situation what should Afghanistan do? What are the challenges India will have to face in post 2014? Those are the million dollar questions. Before entering in those topics, we should briefly recapitulate the most important past incidents of Afghanistan.

  

 BACKGROUND

   The Taliban seized Kabul on 27 September, 1996 and established Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, being supported by Pakistan (military support) and Saudi Arabia. They imposed on the parts of Afghanistan under their control, their political and judicial interpretation of Islam issuing edicts especially targeting women. In this situation Massoud and Rashid Dostum created United Front to fight against Taliban. The Taliban defeated Dostum’s Jumbish military forces in 1998. According to a 55-page report of United Nations, the Taliban while trying to consolidate control over northern and western Afghanistan committed systematic massacres against civilians. Then Pakistan chief of army staff Pervez Musharraf was responsible for sending thousands of Pakistani to fight alongside the Taliban and Bin Laden against the forces of Massoud. From 1996-2001 the Al-Qaeda terrorist network of Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri became a state within Afghanistan. In early 2001, Massoud asked international community to provide humanitarian help to the people of Afghanistan. On 9th September, 2001 Massoud was assassinated by suicide attackers and two days later about 3,000 people were killed in U.S.A. The U.S. government identified Laden, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Al-Qaeda organization based in and allied to Taliban’s Emirate of Afghanistan as the perpetrators of the attacks as a result the U.S. lead forces attacked Afghanistan and Taliban government was toppled. New government under Hamid Karzai was formed. At the same time international security assistance force was established by U.N Security Council to assist Karzai administration and to provide security for the Afghan people.

   While Taliban began regrouping inside Pakistan, more coalition troops entered, escalating the U.S.-led war. Meanwhile the rebuilding of war torn Afghanistan kicked off in 2002. The Afghan nation was able to form some democratic structure over the years and some progress was made in key areas such as governance, economy, health, education, transport and agriculture. NATO is training Afghan armed forces as well its national police. ISAF and Afghan troops led many offensives against Taliban but failed to defeat them fully. By 2009 a Taliban-led shadow government began to form  in many parts of the country complete with their own version of mediation court.                

    In 2010 international conference of Afghanistan in London, Afghan president Hamid Karzai said that he intended to reach out to the Taliban leadership. Supported by NATO, Karzai called on group leadership to take part in a Loya Jirga (mass meeting usually prepared for major events) meeting to initiate peace talks. These steps have resulted in an intensification of bombing, assassination and ambushes. Some Afghan groups believe that Karzai plans to appease insurgents senior leadership at the cost of democratic constitution, democratic process and progress in the field of human rights especially women’s rights.                  

AF-PAK   RELATION

   Af-Pak relation began in August, 1947 after the partition of India which created the dominion of Pakistan (Now Islamic Republic of Pakistan).      

   Relation between two countries have been negatively affected by issues related to Durand line, the 1978- present war (i.e. Mujahidin, Afghan refugees, Taliban insurgencies and border skirmishes) including water and the growing influence of India in Afghanistan. 

THE EMERGING SITUATION                                                                                                                        

   The withdrawal of Western forces at the time when Afghanistan is far more destabilized and insecure since 2001 inevitably raises several issues of concern. After a decade long direct engagement and intervention, indifference and apathy are growing in Western approach and strategy towards the future of Afghanistan.

   The Pakistan politico-military stalemate, effectively maneuvered by the Pakistan-backed Taliban and their allies, has made the war increasingly unsustainable for the West. The Taliban guerrillas along with Haqqani network have quietly succeeded in raising the rate of attrition among the Western forces who may have been winning the battles but not the war. The Taliban and their allies despite not winning the battles appear to be gaining and upper hand in the war. While Western forces suffered from differing rules and perceptions about the war of terror, the Taliban and their allies have unsteadily consolidated their influence and made common cause against a vastly superior Western military. These have worked to the advantage of the Taliban and their Pakistani sponsors.

   The U.S. would like to maintain some form of military presence in Afghanistan for years, beyond 2014. However, it is doubtful whether it will stabilize the country. Meanwhile the three components of U.S. current strategy –reconciliation process with the top insurgent leadership operating from Pakistan, rebuilding of Afghan national forces (ANSF); and security transition to the ANSF by 2014-is least likely to give expected results. Presently Afghanistan appears to be on the verge of entering into the prolonged phase of anarchy and violence.

   The whole idea of negotiating ‘peace’ with Taliban is not very bright. It is opening up yet another opportunity for Pakistani establishment to re-engineer the politics of Afghanistan. The U.S. may temper Pakistani geo-political aspiration in Afghanistan.

   The U.S. and Afghanistan signed a strategic partnership agreement on May 2; 2012.The May agreement says that the countries would initiate, ‘negotiation on a Bilateral Security Agreement’ soon after signing the strategic partnership agreement. So, U.S. may retain its force in Afghanistan. Much would, therefore depend how effective the limited U.S. presence would be after 2014, and how the West would deal with Pakistan regarding the matter. However, the agreement is deemed necessary for the survival of the government in Kabul and strengthening the Afghan Army and police.

   The leadership question is also important here. It is still not clear if both presidential and parliamentary election could be held in 2014-15, and how credible the electoral exercise will be if ISAF pulls out or draws down from Southern and Eastern parts of the country which would inevitably fall under the direct control of Taliban. Finally if the election could not be held then what are the possible alternatives available in terms of political arrangement to ensure that there is no political vacuum in Kabul. This could be an opportunity to temporarily bring U.S. and Pakistan together if both reach a consensus on post Karzai leadership. This may subsequently lead to defection from the Taliban, with so called ‘moderate’ Taliban joining the government. But it is not very accepted theory to the vast section of Afghan people. In case of failed political transition in 2014, there is a possibility of greater tension between U.S. and Afghanistan, on one hand and between U.S. and Pakistan, on the other. This may lead to greater anarchy or even a new round of civil war in parts of the country. There could also be a special operation by U.S. commandos against Haqqani network and Taliban leadership based inside Pakistan (like operation Geronimo on May 2, 2001). 

 THE MOST LIKELY FUTURE SCENARIO

    Based on some broad historical determinants and political trends, an attempt can be made to build the most likely future scenario as the Afghan conflict and war enters the fourth decade. Afghanistan with virtually all state institutions destroyed with no single authority enjoying National legitimacy; and with people’s perception severely polarized along social and ideological lines, is likely to remain in a state of socio-political ferment for decades to come. Since the overthrow of monarchy in 1973 and subsequent destruction of old political order, no political system or affecting national institution could evolve in the country. The western attempt to create new political system after the overthrow of Taliban in 2001 has failed for various reasons. The perceptions about state, its orientation and authority, distribution of power, and forms of governance are often too divergent and vary from region to region and one ethnic group to another.

    As 2014 approaches and most of the American troops withdraw, the authority of Afghan government is further fragmented and diluted. Thousands of American troops and troops from NATO countries would be stationed in Kabul after the Kabul Washington strategic partnership agreement. The west sponsored reconciliation initiatives continue to be rebuffed by Taliban and Haqqani Network. America however continues to rely on drone strikes and conducts special operation against insurgent leadership operating from Pakistan. President Karzai is unable to hold the post beyond his term and presidential and parliamentary elections might get delayed. The relation between Washington and Islamabad remains tense. Hectic diplomatic efforts are on to build consensus on the composition of a caretaker transitional government. The Taliban continues to gain strength especially in the areas around Kabul; groups from the north build alliances to deal with growing insurgency.

     Despite differences between U.S. and Pakistan on post-Karzai arrangement, a caretaker transitional government which is recognized by the U.N is appointed in Kabul pending Presidential and Parliamentary elections. As election could not be held even after a prolonged delay due to lack of security and resources, the caretaker transitional government collapses and the Parliament is dysfunctional. By 2020, the joint Afghan-U.S. military facilities are constantly under attack from Taliban and Haqqani network. Defection from Afghan Army and police are frequent. However, West continues to fund Afghan Army. The U.S. carries out some special operation in Pakistan against the top Taliban leadership inside Pakistan and at the same time to build and support a coalition comprising mainly functions from the north and some Pasthun mitia from south and east, including few low and mid level former Taliban commanders. NATO and Russia are working closely to ensure supplies for the remaining American-led force fighting in Afghanistan. Groups from the north are asking for defacto partition of the country. The international community is engaged in a round of diplomatic initiatives to bring various Afghan factions together. Political uncertainty and violence continues.  

  INDIA’S POLICY OPTIONS

   As per official statements: “India considers extremist ideologies to be very dangerous and a national security threat. To that extent, India wants to utilize its development program in Afghanistan (deny such ideologies space to grow)to help Afghanistan stabilize and emerge as an economic hub linking south and central Asia through a network of trade and transit linkages that would benefit the people of entire region.”     

   However, India has limited leverages in Afghanistan. It has not nurtured the different section of East. The Pashtuns remains large indifferent towards India. For the non Pashtun groups, India is possible counter-force to the Pakistan sponsored Pashtun insurgent groups, especially Taliban.

    Also, India hardly figures in western straightly towards Afghanistan and Pakistan. India’s present and relatively huge contribution has often initiated skepticism and critics in view of her historically adversarial relations with Pakistan. It is generally believed that Afghan problem can’t be resolved until India and Pakistan resolve Kashmir issue.

 RECOMMENDATIONS

1. India should take long term policy towards Afghanistan. It may be increasingly difficult for India to maintain the momentum of the relationship with Afghanistan beyond 2014 due to lack of effective government in Kabul. The training and capacity building program, India is conducting for Afghans too may get disrupted. So, it is important for India to expand its engagement with various Afghan factions, including Taliban elements willing to work with India.

2. Since Pakistani establishment will always try to deny space for India in Afghanistan, it is important that India develops its leverages within Afghanistan and Pakistan.

3. Due to fractious nature of Afghan politics, India should firmly avoid direct military involvement in Afghanistan. However, as a follow-up to the strategic partnership agreement India signed with Afghanistan October 2011, institutionalizing its engagement with Afghan Army, police and the Afghan intelligences should be a constant endeavor.      

4. Lastly, India’s policy should be innovative. India needs to make people-to-people contact with Afghanistan and attract the young generation of Afghanistan through its various policy and schemes.

    References: 

1. Wikipedia :http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghanistan

2. I.D.S.A :http://www.idsa.in/policybrief/Post2014AfghanistanAndIndiasOptions_180712

3. ’The Islamic challenges in west Asia’ (book)
-----------------------------------------------------
Arghyadip Bhattacharya, M. Sc(Applied Mathematics, C.U.),K.V.P.Y scholar.Any opinion expressed herein is solely that of the author and Indian Policy takes no responsibility for the facts and opinion laid down in the article.

Book Review : God's Terrorists(Charles Allen)

Indira Mukherjee

One of the greatest pressing issues which plague this increasingly inter-connected, materialistic and complicated world is terrorism. And out of the most gruesome acts that we have seen in the recent past, the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Centre stands out in sharp contrast. It is commonly said that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” and the book “God’s Terrorists” by Charles Allen skilfully explains this thought. It traces the growth of the Wahabi cult and the hidden roots of modern Jihad. It explains how Wahabism makes its entry into India, why the British expansionist policy of the 18^th century comes into conflict with it, how this ideology gets enmeshed with the revolt of 1857 and why the terrorist organisations like Al Qaeda owe allegiance to it. It also tells us that as a theory, Wahabism has a fanaticism attached to it and in practice, it believes in an inherent hostility to people who are not strict adherents of Islam. In short, the author says that Wahabism was always rooted in violent intolerance and it appeared as a champion of the faith of Islam at a time when the triumph of the religion was not proceeding as ordained. This aspect holds true, even today.

To begin with, Wahabism is an Islamic revivalist movement, the guiding ideology behind modern Islamist terrorism. It is named after Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahab [1703-1792] of Najd, Saudi Arabia who under the influence of the medieval theologian Ibn Taymiyyah [1263–1328] aspired to return to the earliest fundamental Islamic sources of learning i.e. the Quran and the Hadith. The movement gained popularity and propaganda due to the financial and political support rendered by the royal house of Saudi Arabia. In terms of belief, Wahabism considers Allah as the only one to be worshipped and leaves no space for tolerance or acceptance of any other religion. Much of this notion is attributed to the experiences of Ibn Taymiyyah who witnessed a lot of Mongol attacks on the Islamic world. The motley group of people from different regions and religions during the medieval period led to a gradual inter-mingling of faiths and consequent dilution of Islam. This led a section of the Islamic society to stress the emphasis on maintaining the purity of Islam by adhering to Quran and Hadith only. Muhammad Wahab carried forward this belief and the formal seeds of Wahabism were sown.  

In early 19^th century, Wahabism made its entry into India as a religious reform movement whose objective was to restore Muslim power in India by overthrowing the Sikhs and the British. Saiyad Ahmad [1786-1831] of Rae Bareilley was the founder of Wahabi movement in India. He believed that India had become dar-ul-kafir [land of unbelievers] and it has to be made dar-ul-harb [land of war] by waging a war against the infidels and the British. For this purpose, he sought the assistance of the Nizam of Hyderabad, the various Pathan tribes of the North West frontier of India and even some Muslim leaders outside India. The regular organisation of Indian Wahabism was set up in Patna and initial spadework done by Vilayat Ali, whereas Inayat Ali, Titu Mir and others popularized it immensely. Since the Wahabis made vigorous preparations to wage a full-scale war against the British, they were looked upon with suspicion. In fact, during the 1857 revolt it was found that the sepoys were in constant touch with the Wahabis at Sittana and there was a supply chain by which men, money and material was being transferred between the Wahabi camp in the north western frontier and Patna. The first two Anglo-Afghan wars in 1839 and 1878 were meant to weed out the influence of the Wahabis so that Afghanistan could be used as a strong buffer state against the expanding kingdom of Russia. In late 1860’s and early 1870’s, the British crackdown increased and many Wahabi leaders were transported for life – this led to a temporary halt in the movement.

The Muslim world again joined hands after the 1^st world war when they rose up against the liberal Government set up in Turkey under the aegis of Mustafa Kemal Pasha Attaturk. Soon after, in 1932 the kingdom of Saudi Arabia was carved out of Nejd and Hijaz. After the oil shock of 1973, the royal house of Saudi Arabia was awash with petrodollars and it became a financial cushion for the Wahabis. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan sparked off another round of jihad wherein the Holy war was waged against the Russians. This war shaped the thought process of Osama Bin Laden, the future leader of Al Qaeda. In fact, the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990 prompted Bin Laden to defend Saudi Arabia by calling his global network of ex-Afghanistani jihadis, beginning with the several thousand Wahabi veterans now back in Arabia. However, the Saudi Government, unlike its traditional support to Wahabis, turned instead to the United States. This feeling of betrayal accompanied with his strong Wahabi convictions led Bin Laden to revisit the Prophet’s injunction that there should not be two religions in Arabia. He became a bitter enemy of the House of Saud and United States, considering them as enemies. Wahabism in the late 20^th century led to the emergence of two different organisations - one tight-knit and localised, the other loose-knit and with global aspirations: the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Osama bin Laden eventually ended up supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan and unleashing terror on the un-Islamic world via the Al Qaeda.

      

      Charles Allen is a fine narrative historian; “God’s Terrorist” depicts the germination, consolidation and expansion of an ideology which is the bedrock of Islamic fundamentalism of modern day. Wahabism has captured the imagination of several people ever since the medieval ages but the kind of strong principles it believes in, along with the missionary zeal with which it is being professed, has made it a subject which one just cannot leave out while studying the birth of modern day terrorism. And the ease and simplicity with which the author has explained this huge trajectory, is commendable. Writing a book with historical underpinnings, the author has delved into rigorous research and background work – one which is clearly visible in the numerous references to the personal accounts of the British officers who served in Indian civil services during the 19th century, collection of rare photographs and inclusion of the extremely minute details pertaining to the war, casualties, arms, locations etc. A combination of these, has catapulted the book to a different platform all together.

            The best part of the book is the details on the confrontation between the Hindustani fanatics and the British Indian Army in mid 19^th century. The complexity of the missions sent to Afghanistan, the often hurt ego of the Governor Generals, the ferocity of the warring frontier tribes, the disadvantage of unfavourable weather during campaigns, the different mechanisms thought of by the officers to win over the “great game” etc would surely keep the readers hooked on to the book. The way in which a supply chain network develops between the “chota godown” at Patna and the “burra godown” at Sittana during the revolt of 1857 makes one think that probably, the commonly held belief of the failure of the sepoy mutiny might not be entirely true because without systematic planning and coordination, such an activity could not have been carried out under the noses of the British administration. The book also carefully explains the threat perceived by the Government from the aficionados of wahabism. In fact, the entire blame of the revolt was put on the Muslims which got further deepened when soon after, Lord Mayo was assassinated by a Wahabi fanatic Sher Ali in Andamans. Thus, in effect the work of later modern Islamic revivalists like Sir Syed Ahmad Khan of Aligarh started by convincing the British that the Muslims were the most loyal subjects of the British crown.

            The author has told his complex story with concision, insight and wide ranging vision. The thread connecting Wahabism, Deoband School, Taliban and Al Qaeda has been clearly portrayed. The very fact that the Wahabi ideology found its way into the 20^th century by opposition to the anti Islamic heretic forces under the complex relations of international politics clearly shows the current relevance of the notion. The post cold war scenario accentuated this feeling of antipathy – the Arab-Israel conflict; Islamic revolution of Iran in 1979; Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; and US military intervention in Middle East alienated a large section of the Muslims, some of whom resorted to violent means to establish the Islamic faith. This ranged from terrorist organisation like Al Qaeda to more radical forms of governments like the Taliban in Afghanistan. These groups were able to sustain due to the money being doled out from the Arabian Peninsula. In fact, when the Taliban Government was established in early years of the first decade of the 21^st century, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan were the first ones to recognize it.

            There are a few places in the book where the narrative becomes a bit too extended and the tone overtly pessimistic. But on the whole, Charles Allen has delivered a book which the readers will read with rapt attention. The relevance of the topic of terrorism and the long trail of history that lies behind it, makes a double delight for the audience. The concept of Jihad and the thought process entailing it, has been very aptly described by the author. And all this has been done in the backdrop of the Indian colonial setup, giving a chance to relate to the environment, ambience and surroundings of the events. On the whole, “God’s Terrorists” is a long, bloody and commandingly told story and it does what we long for history to do; tells a tale of yesteryears that throws new and uncomfortable light on the contemporary world

--------------------------------------------------------------

Indira Mukherjee is an IPS probationer of the 88th FC at LBSNAA, Mussoorie. This post is her review of the book "God's Terrorists" by Charles Allen.

Indigenization of Military Hardware is necessary for India to establish itself as a World Power to reckon with

Indira Mukherjee

Irrespective of whether we consider India as a developing country or an "Asian giant", it would not be a terminological in-exactitude to say that our nation has made its presence felt in the global arena owing to strong economic indicators. It is widely believed that this increased visibility will cause India to dabble more in military matters so as to tackle security issues and gain a solid footing in the international platform. If one does a survey of India’s external security challenges in South Asia, the outcome is that of concern – Indo-Pak skirmishes, long outstanding border dispute with China, Tamil issue in Srilanka, precarious political upheavals in Maldives, an un-ending constitutional crisis in Nepal, withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan, an illegal drugs-arms nexus across Myanmar etc. This current geopolitical quagmire with respect to India's borders and the global notion of equating diplomacy power with military strength, make its imperative for us to decide on a path that India should eventually undertake to showcase its might. Atal Bihari Vajpayee once famously said that –

"You can change friends but not neighbours"

And it is largely because of this fact that India has, in a slow but steady pace, indulged in activities related to military expansion, capacity building, technology upgrade and increase prominence in the international arms market. This continues even today and in future will gain pace for sure.

However, the moot point is that in this era of economic globalization and rapid changes in the security paradigm, should a country like India rely on procuring military hardware from other countries to save time crunch, ramp up world-class military stockpile or focus more on indigenization to buttress sovereignty, reduce costs? The answer to this is embedded in the historical backdrop, cold war experience, political mindset and complexity of current world economic coupling. While it might be an easy option to acquire arms from other countries with reasonable expertise in this field, not giving enough incentive and encouragement to domestic military hardware production will enervate India’s self-reliance in the long run. Overseas procurement and indigenization of defence equipments are two sides of the same coin and needs to be balanced carefully for making a strong, mighty and calculative India. To understand the complexity of arriving at a decision with respect to the preferred avenue for enhancing military capabilities, the following aspects should be considered:

• ·         Legacy of military restraint
• ·         Stimulus for defence ramp up
• ·         On indigenization
• ·         Benefits and problems of foreign purchase
• ·         The way forward

Legacy of Military Restraint

Reticence in the use of force as an instrument of state policy has been the dominant political condition for Indian thinking on the military [1]. Be it the delay of sending troops to Kashmir in 1948 or the slackened pace of indulging into nuclear testing, India has always reacted with immense amount of restraint in military matters. One might argue that this approach adheres to the words of Isaac Asimov that –

“Violence...is the last refuge of the incompetent”

But many a times, this slowness gives out a wrong signal to the other side. After all, there is no gainsaying in the fact that the world reacts to and observes muscle flexing with hawkish eyes and not to mere promises or ideology only. 

Individual leadership has also led to the evolution of this thought process – India under Jawaharlal Nehru was an example of unified idealism [2]. He was a firm believer in peaceful coexistence and exercised extreme caution before resorting to any military involvement. The case was that of intermittent realism under Indira Gandhi, who waited long for the escalation of the refugee problem before sending troops to East Pakistan. However, India’s stance in 2013 is an example of economic pragmatism and that probably outweighs any other idea, including restraint. A delay in reacting to issues of security undermines the relative strength of a country and India does not wish to be in that category.

This policy of restraint had its own set of ramifications – immediately post independence, the Indian establishment focussed on high ideals and gave less importance to military build up. Once it was struck with the drag of 3 wars in quick succession in 1960s-70s, a quick realization dawned which caused the upper echelons to devise a strategy to scale up military hardware. Socio-economic needs of the country were so pressing during this time that buying arms from other countries seemed to be the quickest way out. This restraint coupled with the polarisation of world support during the cold war and the lack of Indian technical expertise in niche areas, in a way led to a reduced emphasis on indigenization. Thus, to compensate this disadvantage, loss of time and slow pace of research in the previous decades there was a greater zeal to purchase world-class weaponry, especially post 1980s.

India has definitely started moving away from this ideology of restraint, especially owing to its growing affluence and greater presence in the world arena. However, any dramatic changes seem to be at bay because India is a country where the military preparation receives far less attention than it deserves due to the socio-economic dynamics of the political compulsions. Hardly any party manifestoes talk about defence related matters and to be honest, common people are more attracted towards issues that affect them directly, on a daily basis and not issues related to external security. However, it needs to be firmly ingrained in our minds that drawing the attention of the political class towards the increasing precarious situation in south Asia has become ever important. Once this is understood and practiced, India might be able to start shifting from the legacy of restraint and hasten its pace of defence production and procurement – both locally and globally.

Stimulus for Defence ramp up

Though early Indian nationalists such as Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Gopal Krishna Gokhale saw military service as a means to secure home rule; Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, the two Indian leaders with the greatest influence on the direction of independent India, saw military spending as a burden imposed by the British in defence of their empire. In 1938 Jawaharlal Nehru wrote that India did not face any significant military challenge; the only military role he saw for the Indian Army was in suppressing the tribes of the North-West Frontier Province, who were, in any case, too primitive in his view to fight a modern military outside the tribal areas [3].

The first major stimulus came with the 1962 China war. The debacle was too much of a blot on the face for India at that time which was trying to tread the path of non alignment. The economic and political crisis during 1960’s was so enhanced that India started tilting towards Soviet Russia for its military needs. Developing own hardware during that time was a distant dream, so purchasing arms from friendly nations seemed to be the most practical solution. This pace increased till 1991 when India had to look for alternate sources. Once the economic liberalization regime kicked off, procuring arms from abroad helped in achieving the objective of saving time, ensuring global presence and acquiring the most advanced weaponry of the time. In the 21st century, new actors cropped up for India’s military needs – products of Boeing, Israeli Aerospace Industries [IAI] and MIG started entering Indian soil at a rapid pace. This was coupled with conducting joint army-naval-air exercises with other countries so as to assess comparative strengths, weaknesses, obstacles, threats and eventually, devise the roadmap for increasing military hardware. This included foreign purchase as well as indigenization efforts. However, imports have gained an upper edge over local production. In fact, in 2013 India was declared the world's biggest weapons importer, ahead of China [4].

South Asia might not have witnessed any large scale military event after the 1999 Kargil crisis but it has always been simmering with security issues. In recent times, it has escalated to a different proportion all together, and that too simultaneously – the beheading of Indian soldiers in Pakistan, the lurking head of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the ethnic strife in Myanmar, the political coup in Maldives or the incessant constitutional crisis in Nepal. India lies at the centre of all this and is left with no option but to focus on its external security situation. Piracy along the Indian Ocean is another important root of this equation especially because most of India’s imports and exports are routed through international waterways. A strong and self reliant India with a strong arms base is thus a “sine qua non” - not for attacking but for defending ourselves and assisting our strategic partners.

Another very important reason for India to step up its defence production/procurement process is its geographical proximity with China. It is interesting to note that both India and China achieved their independence at roughly the same time, they have similar population but after about 65 years of their free existence, there is a huge difference between their military capabilities. A relative comparison between the two may be tabulated hereunder [5]--> 

	India	China
Total Aircraft Strength	1962	5048
Total Helicopter Strength	620	901
Total Mortar Strength	5000	10050
Anti-Tank Weaponry Strength	51800	31250
Total Navy Ship Strength	170	972
Submarine Fleet Strength	15	63
Active Military Personnel	1325000	2285000

The numbers speak for themselves and a fuel to this, is the discussion in foreign policy think tanks on “String of Pearls”. At the ground level, it means that China is indulging into an encirclement strategy across the Indian coastline by setting up points of strategic influence like Coco Islands off Myanmar, Hambantota port in Srilanka and Gwadar in Pakistan; this has created an immense pressure on the military establishment of India to resort to different means to catch up with the military inventory of China – be it via local production or via importing arms from other players in the world.

On Indigenization

Indigenization of military hardware is a conscious effort on the part of the defence establishment to develop products which suit Indian needs, circumstances and demands. In recent months, our Defence Minister, Shri A K Antony, has been repeatedly exhorting the armed forces to procure their weapons and equipment from indigenous sources. It is a well-established fact that no nation aspiring a great power status can expect to achieve it without being substantively self-reliant in defence production [7]. It is widely held that the growing influence of India in the African continent and in Latin America will hugely be enhanced, provided India is able to tap their arms import market and sell off its indigenously developed military hardware. There is a strong local lobbying force in India which wishes to garner the benefits of investment and production in this sector. Also, it is also commonly believed that indigenization of defence equipments is the best possible way to move away from the corruption at the top-level owing to inter-country defence deals.

One of the earliest initiatives towards indigenization is the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme [IGMDP]. India has gradually achieved self reliance in the area of ballistic missiles and the epitome of this feat is the successful testing of the Inter-continental Ballistic missile [ICBM] Agni V. Similar efforts in this regards are the Main Battle Tank Arjun, HAL’s Light Combat Aircraft Tejas and INS Sunayna - India’s largest Offshore Patrol Vessel OPV. A very seminal role in this regard is played by the Defence Research and Development Organisation [DRDO], which is an arm of the Ministry of Defence [MoD]. It caters to the research needs of all the three wings of the army-navy-air force and develops products on a pilot basis for onward mass production by the Ordnance factories.

One of the major and recent most efforts towards indigenization has been the F-INSAS project which is meant to equip the Infantry with state-of-the-art equipment. F-INSAS means Futuristic Infantry Soldier as a System.[8] It basically aims at "converting an infantryman into a fully-networked all-terrain, all-weather, weapons platform with enhanced lethality, survivability, sustainability, mobility and situational awareness" for the digitised battlefield of the future. Most of the equipments are being developed by DRDO.

However, there are some basic issues surrounding this, and for that matter any military hardware indigenization program in India which has to go through the unavoidable process of trinity - DRDO "creates" on a pilot basis, Ordnance Factories "produces" on a mass basis and the Army/Navy/Air Force expects on "State-of the Art" basis. DRDO complains of not having quality engineers owing to “brain drain” while Ordnance factories complain of getting impractical solutions from DRDO and the latter is unable to understand the bottlenecks in a mass production assembly line. Thus, there is a disconnect between the DRDO and Ordnance factory board. Quality control, adherence to specifications, bureaucratic hassles and corruption are additional bottlenecks.

Another aspect related to the Government of India’s official policy towards purchasing military hardware is the procurement process. The Defence Procurement Procedure [DPP] manual was introduced in 2005 and was amended once again in April 2013 to reflect the current thinking on ‘buying Indian’. However, the emphasis on self-reliance remains wishful thinking at present as most weapons and equipment continue to be imported. Thus, even if products are locally made, the dependency on foreign countries continues as the constituent parts are often made abroad. Moreover, the lack of clarity on guidelines for local procurement, differences between the political establishment and military personnel with respect to the percentage of private participation and relative dichotomy of their approach towards indigenization makes the situation complex.

Benefits and problems of foreign purchase

The two world wars and the arms race during the cold war gave an obvious advantage to US and USSR in terms of accumulating military stockpile and investment in defence research. For countries like India, purchasing arms from these countries was an attractive deal and still is. Be it Akula-II nuclear submarine or INS Vikramaditya or AWACS or Sukhoi or Brahmos cruise missile, each purchase/joint venture has acted as a feather in the military cap of India – it has given India a relative edge in the world military stage. The Indo-US nuclear deal has also led to an enhancement of Indian presence in the global nuclear arena and with India winning the confidence of the Nuclear Suppliers Group [NSG], the possibility of a nuclear foray into the military sector in near future cannot be ruled out all together. Moreover, generally speaking, an increased military trade relation between two countries is advantageous to the economic prowess of the constituent parties. It boosts the global economic cohesion and strengthens the pan-world business network.

A special mention in this regard is to be made with respect to the rising stature of India in the world arms market as a buyer. Very recently, India floated the tender for 126 Medium multi role combat aircraft MMRCA in which the finalists included the French Dassault, American Lockheed Martin, Euro-fighter, Sweden’s Saab and Russian MIG. The deal after rounds of discussion on technical specifications, cost implications and suitability of requirements, was clinched by the French manufacturer Dassault’s Rafale. This is the biggest defence deal that India has floated and is meant to inflate the image of India as one of the countries which are to be taken as having a no nonsense attitude towards stepping up their military hardware. An enhanced co-operation in military matters has a domino effect on other sectors as well leading to cost optimization for the receiving country. For e.g. – the Dassault deal is allegedly clubbed with the French Areva nuclear reactors in Jaitapur. It also gives some kind of fuel to the items of track II diplomacy, be it in cultural or social or educational initiatives.

However, an indiscriminate buying of foreign military hardware has its own set of issues. While India has been manufacturing Russian fighter aircraft and tanks under license for many years, the Russians never actually transferred weapons technology to India [7]. For any problems, maintenance and upgrade, we have to depend on Russian technicians. Additionally, with respect to US, any arms purchase is tied to a host of agreements like End Use Monitoring Agreement [EUMA]. EUMA is rooted in the extraterritorial application of U.S. law, which demands “reasonable assurance” that the recipient state is complying with American regulations regarding the use and security of defence articles and services. The avowed aim is to enhance American national-security and foreign-policy objectives [9].

There is no such thing as a “free lunch” – quid pro quo is one of the biggest realities of today’s world and it works in the field of defence deals as well. When a country wishes to export its top class military products to India, it usually ends up engaging itself in a lobbying practice in India. Unhealthy competition in this area leads to corruption, which is the most dangerous predicament of such foreign defence deals. Military scams like Bofors, Tatra, Scorpene deal, Chopper gate etc have grossly tarnished the image of the Indian political establishment which often pushes such deals in return of kick backs. At the end of the day, it is the poor tax payer’s money which goes to a waste. Billions are spent on such deals and many a times it does not serve the purpose of strengthening security as most of the equipments need to be frequently sent abroad for non-adherence to performance expectations, retro-fitting and upgrade. This process traps us in the loop of everlasting foreign dependence.

The way forward

The Security scenario around us is so volatile that we cannot afford to take any risks. We are living in dangerous surroundings, so armed forces need the most modern equipments at the earliest. Our armed forces is the most vital asset of the country – disaster management during floods, earthquakes, tsunami or prevention of communal riots or efforts towards counter insurgency operations; none of these work without their assistance. There is a perceived feeling in the political circles that the armed forces have a mindset of relying on imports to meet operational requirements [10]. This is primarily because of the displeasure shown by the Tri-services towards delay in indigenous production coupled with non-performance of locally made military hardware. While this cannot be entirely denied but it simultaneously undermines the vast potential that the domestic defence production sector has and the kind of long term stability that it can impart to India’s military sector. In the short run, procuring arms from abroad might be the preferred route, but for long term sustainability, there needs to be an equal stress on indigenization of military hardware.

As the largest buyer of arms in the world, India should stress on joint ventures and partnerships with the foreign arms suppliers and should not restrict itself as a buyer only. A successful example in this regard is the Indo-Russian joint production of the Brahmos cruise missile which is the fastest supersonic missile in the world currently. Such collaboration helps in achieving technical expertise and knowhow in a stepwise fashion leading to gradual self reliance. Arranging for simple clearance rules for FDI in selected sectors of defence production will also act as an incentive to the foreign players. Popularizing defence expo to showcase the latest military equipments and clubbing associated deals with offers in other sectors will also act as a booster for India’s military image.

Additionally, with the withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan in 2014, India will have a larger role to play in South Asia and a stockpile of the best of world weaponry will actually help us in protecting the Central Asian country from relapsing into chaos. Considering the piracy threat along the littoral states of Indian Ocean, acquiring sophisticated naval equipments from the big players of the world will help us in curbing the menace of piracy with even more alacrity.  Organizing naval, army or air exercises with other countries on a regular basis will help us in assessing our situation, preparedness and learn the best practices across the world. This will fall in place once the constituent parties indulge in trade related to military hardware.  

As far as local production is concerned, there should be more synthesis between the interests of the armed forces and the political establishment towards improvising indigenization, maintaining transparency and continuous monitoring. Ensuring some kind of tandem via collaborative research between the creativity of the DRDO, the capability of Ordnance Factories and the demand of armed forces will surely help to reduce the friction among the stakeholders of the defence establishment. Additionally, it is very important that India steps up its defence budget. Indigenization cannot happen overnight and hence, a strategic plan should be formulated by the tri-services to map short term and long term interests, assumptions, constraints, issues and risks so as to align them with the defence procurement policy of India. In fact, the procurement process should be simplified and made into a “single window” business. The PSU’s and private sector should be encouraged to deliver efficiently and effectively so that India can come out of the vicious cycle of reliance on foreign technicians.

Our defence minister recently said that –

“Import is the last resort not the easiest resort” [10]

Striking a balance between indigenization and foreign purchase is the key to ensuring India’s military stability and capability. The approach of the political establishment towards army needs must be more focused and pragmatic. The government must give a firm commitment in terms of funds and the MoD should streamline its procedures and processes for speedy procurement of high priority weapons and equipments. On the other hand, the tri-services should appreciate the political compulsions and set forth their agenda and roadmap very clearly so as to extract maximum assistance from the political class. A seamless coupling between the two will lead to a stronger, mightier and resilient India. After all, a synergy between a theoretical plan and implementation of the same in the field of arms purchase and indigenization of military hardware is the key to making India a global power to reckon with.

References:

[1] – Arming without aiming; Stephen P Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta

[2] – Can the Elephant Dance? David Malone

[3] – The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation; Stephen P Cohen

[4] – http://www.sipri.org ; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

[5] – http://www.globalfirepower.com

[6] – http://www.iiss.org/ ; International Institute for Strategic Studies

[7] – http://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/DefenceTechnologyIndigenisation_gkanwal_190913

[8] – http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F-INSAS

[9] – http://www.hindu.com/2009/07/27/stories/2009072755490800.htm

[10] – http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indigenisation-only-way-to-avoid-defence-scams/article4436266.ece

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Indira Mukherjee is an IPS probationer of the 88th FC at LBSNAA, Mussoorie. This post is a replica of her entry for the essay competition.